DePaul Law Review
Volume 17
Issue 1 Fall 1967

Article 17

Friendly and Goldfarb: Crime and Publicity: the Impact of News on
the Administration of Justice
William J. Martin

Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review

Recommended Citation
William J. Martin, Friendly and Goldfarb: Crime and Publicity: the Impact of News on the Administration of
Justice, 17 DePaul L. Rev. 254 (1967)
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review/vol17/iss1/17

This Book Reviews is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Digital Commons@DePaul.
It has been accepted for inclusion in DePaul Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons@DePaul. For
more information, please contact digitalservices@depaul.edu.

DE PAUL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XVII

Crime and Publicity. The Impact of News on the Administration of Justice.
By ALFRED FRIENDLY AND RONALD L. GOLDFARB. New York: Twentieth Century
Fund, 1967. 335 pages. $5.00.
Other than taking you where you want to go, the single greatest benefit of flying
is the opportunity it affords to alter one's perspective of reality. The familiar and
oft-jaded landscape of city and suburb, field and farm, and man himself all fall
into sublime dimension at 18,000 feet. Likewise, the principal accomplishment of
Crime and Publicity is to place the acrimonious Free Press-Fair Trial dialogue in
a meaningful and realistic perspective. Ultimately the book, which is the jointly
executed effort of a libertarian and literate lawyer and an experienced and candid
newspaperman, is much too pro-press. But this bias does not diminish its value.
It is an entirely sensible, redeemingly fair, and exceptionally well written attempt
to negotiate a reasonable detente between the media's right of unfettered publication and the joint right of the State and the accused to an untainted jury. Crime
and Publicity was created under the sponsorship of the Twentieth Century Fund
which permitted Ronald Goldfarb, a practicing attorney who authored two previous
books (Ransom: A Critique of the American Bail System and The Contempt
Power) and Alfred Friendly, an associate editor of the Washington Post and a
director of the American Society of Newspaper Editors, to collaborate on an
analytical venture into a maelstrom scarred by the presence of emotion and the
absence of logic.
The fist to fist confrontation between the twin desiderata of free
press and fair
trial has been stimulated by several recent events. Most notably, the public awareness has been ensnared by the reversal of Dr. Sam Shepperd's conviction, a case
most Americans followed, for better or worse, from beginning to end, and the
sharp criticism of the news media voiced by the Warren Commission. Media
Associations and Bar Associations have gnashed their teeth and unleashed a
barrage of invectives and a plethora of recommendations. The controversy reached
a symbolic culmination in the Richard Franklin Speck case when a Chicago newspaper filed a mandamus action against the trial judge in the midst of one of the
most serious homicide prosecutions in the history of Illinois.' The issue, then,
is very much with us.
One of the most endearing qualities of Crime and Publicity is that it persuasively
establishes that the problem of prejudicial publicity is more qualitative than
quantitative-it affects only a fractional segment of all criminal cases. The cases it
does affect are ex necessitate and by definition the ones most people follow. The
problem ordinarily arises only when the case is tried before a jury. According to
statistics in The American Jury, only 15% of state felony indictments and 8% of
federal criminal charges reach jury verdict. Translating these trial figures into
newspaper coverage, we find most crimes and their resulting prosecutions go unreported. In one typical month, there were 11,724 felony arrests in New York City.
The New York Daily News, a tabloid not noted for its bashfulness in crime
coverage or coverage of anything else, mentioned 41 of these cases. As part of
their research for Crime and Publicity, Goldfarb and Friendly compared all crime
stories in the Washington Post in 1963 with the felony docket for the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia. They found that of 1509 indicted defendants, only 312 achieved the distinction of getting their names in the
paper-80% of the Felon Class of 1963 basked in anonymity. Judge J. Skelly
1 People ex rel. The Tribune Co. v. Paschen, No. 40507, Illinois Supreme Court.
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Wright has offered the opinion that less than 1% of all criminal cases in the United
States receive a line of newspaper recognition and 75-90% of the reported 1%
end up in guilty pleas. Professor Kalven believes prejudicial publicity is "enormously less of a problem than it was thought to be." And most often the publicity
which does occur i not prejudicial but is straight reporting of neutral facts.
Though exceptionally surprising, these statistics are not altogether comforting.
The recurring theme of Crime and Publicity is that the Press is the community's
most effective instrument for detecting the real enemies of a fair trial-official
corruption, police excesses, prosecutorial and judicial incompetence, and political
favoritism. The folklore of newspaperdom is that crime news is reported for the
noble purpose of informing the body politic of what is awry in its streets and in
the judicial body. But if the overwhelming majority of criminal activity and
criminal trials go unpublished, the scimitar must be rusting in its scabbard. The
cases which routinely go unreported in metropolitan dailies would rock the foundations of a small town. These facts go a long way toward demolishing the press
inspired concept that it is the ever-alert conscience of the community.
Goldfarb and Friendly concede that much of the crime news which lands in
print is commercialized and vulgar. They maintain, however, that such sensationalism, albeit lamentable, is irrelevant to the Free Press-Fair Trial issue
because it seldom affects the selection of a jury at the locus of the crime. However,
we may profitably consider such matters as widespread coverage of an out-ofState crime involving sex-wealth-violence (preferably with a doctor) as material
evidence of the reason for the publication of much crime news. It is less than
candid and more than naive to ignore the economic fact that the news media are
not eleemosynary institutions. The first rule of the Press, like the politician and
all other forms of organic life, is to survive. We might get further if the Press
would candidly admit that much crime coverage is published for the legitimate and
primary purpose of making money instead of the usual lofty utterings about being
the conscience of the community. The commercial motives of the media are
honest, but to cloak them with self-righteous trappings is pharisaical. And when we
worry about political favoritism in the courts, let us not forget it can occur in
the composition of the front page. The idealistic claims of the Press will be enhanced when it makes a concerted effort to supplement juicy crime stories with
high caliber interpretative reporting of the daily and unglamorous administration
of criminal justice.
Although the well publicized case may be of no great legal moment in itself,
neither the news media nor the legal profession can afford to neglect the fact that
the sensational case is the average citizen's spectacular civics lesson. The cause
cel~bre tests to the quick the community's basic faith in the judicial system. It is
urgent that the operators of the system do not burden it with ritual and mystique
to the extent that it fails to fairly convict the obviously guilty and to see that
they stay convicted. Since the cause celebre is a public microscope for observing
the machinery of justice, it is important that the Press, which serves as the
magnifying instrument, does not itself jeopardize the system by indulging in conduct (either in or out of court) which interferes with a fair trial.
The limited available empirical data tends to suggest that pre-trial news may
make everyone aware of a case but it does not have a significant effect in corrupting the ability of jurors to be fair. However, no precision tool exists which can
probe the recesses of the human mind to determine precisely what effect pre-trial
publicity has on the twelve persons who ultimately sit in judgment of a given
case. Crime and Publicity assumes that pre-trial news reporting of a case does
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influence jurors to an unknown extent-less than defense lawyers claim and more
than newspaper editors admit.
This being true, what techniques may be safely utilized to insulate prospective
jurors from the possibility of contamination by a pre-formed fixed opinion of guilt
or innocence? Many critics maintain we should adopt the English doctrine of
contempt by publication, a doctrine which Lord Devlin has summarized in these
terms: Under pain of contempt the English Press is prohibited from uttering any
comment about a matter before a court that might tend to influence a jury in
any way, whether done with good or bad intent, or with or without knowledge.
Goldfarb and Friendly find this stricture intolerable, and they believe it could not
survive an Atlantic crossing let alone flourish on American soil. Why? To begin
with, the absence of a protective constitutional cloak and the presence of strict
libel laws renders the British Press substantially less free ab initio than the
American Press. We are not comparing apples with apples. Moreover, the subject
matter covered by the two media varies so greatly in quantity as to amount to a
difference in kind. To wit, London's 1965 homicide rate was 37 deaths while New
York City had 631 murders in the same year. The authors believe the quality of
English justice is preserved by the absolute separation of courts and politics, the
superior caliber of its judiciary, the highly ethical standards of its Bar, and the
fact that the average criminal case is tried within one month of the arrest and
the appeal is concluded two weeks after the trial. Finally, the British Press is
not subjected to a total pre-trial news blackout-they may permissibly publish
the complete details of the public preliminary hearing which, unlike the sketchy
American preliminary hearing, is an extensive mini-trial.
The most effective argument Crime and Publicity mounts against the contempt
remedy is that it is impractical-the United States Supreme Court has consistently
reversed contempt by publication convictions on First Amendment grounds. Instead, the Court has substituted the remedy of reversing the convictions of
criminal defendants whose guilty verdicts were possibly tainted by the overexposure of jurors to prejudicial publicity. This is hardly a pleasing solution. All
prosecutors are aware of the enormous problems which arise in a retrial several
years after the fact, i.e., missing witnesses and missing memories. Justice does
not prevail when a guilty defendant is subsequently acquitted because the conduct
of an agency extrinsic to the justice machinery-the news media-contaminated
an otherwise just verdict.
Crime and Publicity does not praise contempt but buries it. The authors, having
accomplished this burial, then turn their attention to the "filtering procedures"
developed by the law itself to screen out any harmful particles of prejudice which
lie in the aftermath of pre-trial publicity. Like most of the law's artifacts, the
machinery is not perfect, but the cases in which it does not work are exceedingly
few. Crime and Publicity cites four of these tools: Change of Venue, Continuance,
Voir Dire, and Jury Instructions. We shall consider each in turn.
CHANGE OF VENUE. If the case is a cause cel~bre in only one geographical area
of a State, a change of venue to virgin territory may effect a total solution to the
problem. But the virgin territory may not long endure in that optimal condition.
Whether the Constitution follows the Flag is disputable, but it is not disputable
that the media pack up and travel with a sensational case and may well infect a
previously uncontaminated area before jury selection commences. The local cause
cel~bre is somewhat of a rarity anyway. The ubiquity of the mass media permits it
to permeate every nook and cranny in the nation. News of a sensational crime is
transmitted across wide perimeters with the transcending force of Hertz and Coca-
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Cola ads. Despite the pervasiveness of modern communication, a change of venue
may offer some relief. Although the same facts may be reported throughout a
State, the emotional involvement of the citizenry diminishes as the distance from
the scene of the crime increases.
CONTINUANCE. Most of the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune are healed
by time. This is no less true of the remembrance of publicity past. Some defense
attorneys reduce this palliative to an absurdity by requesting an indefinite continuance or an outright dismissal. A period of time should elapse between the
excitement of the arrest and the trial, but the passage of a few months is sufficient
to erase whatever memories are erasable.
VOIR DIRE. Most of us concede the weakness of voir dire is that veniremen who
want to sit on a sensational case badly enough will lie about their exposure to
prejudice while others are too embarrassed to admit their true feelings. Nonetheless,
a meaningful voir dire is a potent means for the prosecution and defense to lay
bare prejudice of any kind.2
Goldfarb and Friendly suggest that the defense is handicapped in probing a
venireman about his exposure to prejudicial publicity because questions like: "Did
you read anything concerning whether or not the accused has a previous conviction?" can create prejudice where none previously existed. A shrewd defense
lawyer can avert this disaster by asking open-ended questions like: "What do you
remember from your reading about the defendant's background?"
Voir dire in a publicity case can be carried off much more safely if it is conducted in accord with the recommendation of the Reardon Committee that each
prospective juror be interrogated out of the presence of all other prospective jurors.
Judge Herbert C. Paschen implemented this recommendation very effectively in
the Speck case. Each day 50 prospective jurors were summoned to the courtroom
and given preliminary instructions about the case by the court. Then 12 jurors
would be placed in the jury room while the remainder were sent to another room
on the same floor. Judge Paschen called each one of the first 12 into the courtroom
alone and initiated the voir dire. Not only did this procedure prevent one juror
from tainting other jurors if a prejudicial remark were made, but it produced much
more candid responses from the jurors. Gone was the threat of social pressure which
inhibits jurors from answering honestly and at length when they are selected
en masse.
INSTRUCTIONS. Instructions are neither as valuable as appellate courts pretend
nor as worthless as trial lawyers believe. For nullifying the effects of pre-trial
publicity, a judge's oral and informal directives to the entire venire can often be
more important in creating the proper atmosphere than the written instructions at
the close of the case. Judge Paschen accomplished this most ably in Speck by
telling prospective jurors that the element of human error was inherently present
in news stories since they were the product of many hands-from source to
reporter to rewrite man to copy editor to news editor to linotype operator. More2 It is popularly misconceived that the prosecution in a criminal case seeks jurors
who have a recollection of pre-trial publicity because they assuredly will be more prone
to convict. This is not so. A prosecutor prepares a case for presentation as a logical,
cohesive entity which is entirely self-sufficient. It is perhaps more dangerous for him

than it is for the defense if jurors attempt to interstitch this fabric with vague recollections of inaccurate news accounts of irrelevant events. If they have any sense, both

qides will select jurors who will honestly decide the case based upon the evidence
adduced in open court and nothing else,
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over, news stories contained hearsay and were neither subject to cross-examination
nor given under oath. These judicial comments gave the jurors a sensible understanding of the reasonable requirement that they judge the case solely upon the
evidence. The written instructions at the end of the trial served as a reminder of
the analytical pre-trial admonitions.
The authors of Crime and Publicity arrive at the conclusion that the remedy for
all but a small portion of the publicity problem is reasonable silence by the official
sources of prejudicial news. They make the embarrassing discovery that there is
no known case of an attorney being punished for a violation of Canon 20 which
forbids any comment on litigation except quotation from filed public documents
and which discourages all ex parte statements. Goldfarb and Friendly believe disclosure should be made of (1) the circumstances of the crime, (2) details of the
pursuit of the defendant, and (3) events surrounding the arrest; conclusions of
guilt or prejudicial characterizations of the accused should not be made. This brief
rule is not without infirmity. Often occasions arise where law enforcement officials
should not relate the details of the pursuit of the defendant or the events surrounding his arrest. To do so would be to deliberately release a barrage of inherently
prejudicial pre-trial publicity.
A disturbing facet of Crime and Publicity is its disagreement with the recommendation of the Reardon Committee that defense counsel only may "announce
without further comment that the client denies the charges against him." The
authors contend that a naked denial is no rejoinder to the arrest and indictment
announcement which the Reardon Committee permits the prosecution to make.
They miss the mark. What we seek is trial by jury, not by combat, ordeal, or
newspaper. Any attempt to adjudicate the matter in the media sabotages the
entire system of deciding cases upon the evidence introduced in open court. Goldfarb and Friendly argue that the prohibition is unworkable because an articulate
defendant can advocate his innocence to the press while his attorney cannot. This
is a weak objection. The Court before whom the case is pending can and should
issue an order forbidding the parties as well as the attorneys from making any
extra-judicial statements concerning the merits of the cause.
The authors ultimately conclude that the statistically minimal problem of prejudicial publicity is subject to correction by reasonable official silence before trial
coupled with the use of meaningful voir dire, adequate trial and post-trial instructions, and the granting of changes of venue and continuances where indicated. This
is a sensible but incomplete conclusion. The maximum publicity case may require
further steps which the authors are not willing to take. The Reardon Committee
recommendation that pre-trial hearings be held in camera can be exceptionally
useful in preventing the release of the prejudicial publicity which normally attends
the hearing of motions to suppress evidence. The several and lengthy pre-trial
evidentiary motions in the Speck case were heard in camera with the agreement
of all parties. Moreover, almost all the official documents in Speck, such as the
list of witnesses and descriptions of fingerprint and other scientific evidence submitted in response to discovery motions by the defense, were filed with Judge
Paschen himself in camera and were not released to the Clerk's Office for the
public until the conclusion of the trial. Goldfarb and Friendly are troubled by
any postponement in the publication of the news of judicial proceedings. They
fear that silence can be a mask for mischief. They allege that delayed publication
is in effect no publication because the stories lose their news value once the trial
is ended. But if the danger is official skullduggery, the Press can uncover it with
unfettered post-trial use of the transcript of the pre-trial hearings. If the fear

1967]

BOOK REVIEWS

boils down to a desire not to lose newsworthy copy, then this legitimate need
must be weighed against the necessity of preserving an impartial atmosphere prior
to trial. The scale must tip in favor of the latter and not in favor of serving
an honest but harmful need to satisfy public curiosity. The emphasis again must
be that such steps are taken not only to protect an individual defendant, but
to guarantee the integrity of the system, and to protect society's legitimate concern
that a just conviction not be disturbed by forces extrinsic to the trial.
A further step, this one at trial, is virtually dictated by the terms of Shepperd
v. Maxwell 3-the issuance of a comprehensive set of rules governing press conduct at the trial. The press order in Speck was entered by the Court with the
agreement of the parties. An agreed order is a reasonable undertaking. It affords
the defense an opportunity to advise the Court of what restrictions it believes
are necessary to protect the accused. The paramount interest of the prosecution
in a press order is to guarantee the integrity of a conviction from the taint of
reversible error which can occur if trial judges fail to follow the mandate of
Shepperd. Lawyers for either side in a criminal case have no interest in decreasing
or increasing the circulation of the news media-their interest lies solely in protecting their respective clients from disruptive influences in the courtroom.
Ironically, Judge Paschen's press order in Speck, which Newsweek called "the
strictest ever laid down for a major criminal trial," was no obstacle to the working press covering the case, most of whom believed the rules were reasonable
restraints designed to prevent activity which would hamper a fair trial or which
would lead to the reversal of a just conviction. One of the very few gaps in
Crime and Publicity is its failure to discuss the merits of orders governing media
conduct at a trial.
But the book treats another subject most other commentators ignore by suggesting a fresh approach to the question of whether or not trials should be televised. Statistically relevant to this question is the overwhelming fact that 130
million Americans watch our 72 million television sets. Half of the American
public receives most of its news from television. In submitting that we should
experiment with televised trials instead of reacting viscerally to them, the authors
write:
Maintenance of the dignity and posture of the court is a legitimate concern. The
court must be a "quiet place." Its singleminded purpose, to find the truth and administer
justice, dares not be diminished, much less changed. For the legal profession and for us
all to worry about televison on this score is to do no less than is proper.
But is this worry, this sense of possible danger, enough to warrant incursions on an
institution protected by the First Amendment? Is it enough on which to base a farreaching legal discrimination?
We confess to our own uncertainty about this central question.
But we believe that before it is finally answered more consideration should be given
to the argument that television also has as great a potential to enhance the public view
of the administration of justice as to degrade it. Television could report trials fairly

and exactly and with solemnity, just as it has presented other events without any loss
of decorum-the British coronation, royal weddings, the Kennedy and Churchill
funerals, state visits, medical and scientific accomplishments, serious legislative debates,
and the sessions of the United Nations.
Certain events are basically dignified, and all communications media can preserve
is dignified, there is no intrinsic reason why television
their special quality. If a trial
4
cannot report it with dignity.
a Shepperd v. Maxwell, 16 L. Ed. 2d 600.
4 A. FRIENDLY & R. GOLDFARB, CRIMrLE AND

PUBLICITY,

at 232-233 (1967).
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Or, as one federal judge put it, if a lawyer is a ham, he will be a ham no
more to national television than he is to an empty courtroom.
Crime and Publicity ends with the final theme that a determination by the
courts and law enforcement agencies to protect defendants from potentially prejudicial news is more important than the exact words of any program. This conclusion regrettably forces the path to run in only one direction. If we are to
succeed, the press must sincerely join in this determination. Perhaps the starting
point is for both sides to sit together at the conference table without recrimination
and discuss the issues with the same candor that permeates this book.
WILLIAM J. MARTIN*

*Assistant State's Attorney, Cook County, Illinois; Member of the Illinois Bar.
J.D., Loyola University. Mr. Martin was the Chief Prosecutor in the much publicized
Speck trial.

Criminal Interrogationand Confessions, 2nd Ed. By FRED E.

INBAU AND JOHN

E.

REID. Baltimore: The Williams & Wilkins Company, 1967. Pp. 224. $8.00.
An interrogator's "work is, so to speak, a kind of free-form of art . . ." spoke
one of Dostoevsky's characters in Crime and Punishment. Inbau and Reid have
achieved a remarkable degree of success in demonstrating that the art of the
interrogator is subject to systematic, almost mechanical, application.
One hundred and one years after the Russian novelist wrote that the criminal
himself morally demands punishment and public penances, the police investigator
is shown how to most effectively accommodate him. One is tempted to ask the
authors whether their theories evolved during their years of experience or whether
the years of experience merely confirmed for them Dostoevsky's genius in evaluating human nature.
In Crime and Punishment we find the suspect being told: "You were very upset
over something. Even now, you seem a bit on the pale side," and, "You can't
write-the pen drops out of your hand." Inbau advises pointing out to the suspect
"pulsations of the carotid artery, excessive activity of the Adam's apple, footwiggling, wringing of the hands, and dryness of the mouth."
Dostoevsky's inquisitor seems to excuse crime by stating that it is due to
environment. Inbau advises an interrogator to "sympathize with the subject by
telling him that anyone else under similar conditions or circumstances might have
done the same thing,"' and, "Reduce
the subject's guilt feeling by minimizing the
2
moral seriousness of his offense."
Inbau suggests that it is a sign of guilt (though not conclusive) when a subject
tries to explain away non-existing incriminating evidence which the investigator
has told him does exist. Dostoevsky has his character state the criminal will try
to admit all the superficial and unavoidable facts; "only he will try to find different
reasons for them . .. ."
Inbau explains the use of what he calls "the friendly-unfriendly act" with two
interrogators, one of whom intercedes on behalf of the subject against the unfriendly investigator. Dostoevsky has a similar "Mutt and Jeff" routine operate
1 INBAU AND REIn, CRIMInAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 38 (2d ed. 1967).

2 Id. at 40.

